News of the 28-point peace plan to end the Ukraine War broke on Wednesday.
US online media outlet Axios reported that the Trump administration had been "secretly working in consultation with Russia" to draft a plan to end the war.
Axios quoted a top Russian official as saying he was "optimistic" about the details.
That set alarm bells ringing in Brussels.
EU foreign ministers were gathering on Thursday for a meeting that was to have been dominated by the Middle East peace plan, not a new Trump-Putin scheme for Ukraine.
Once again, it seemed that despite US President Donald Trump's professed frustration with Vladimir Putin, he had been all along plotting to throw Ukraine to the Russian wolves with a box-ticking plan for the Kremlin.
With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government embroiled in a corruption scandal, and mounting pressure on him to sack some of his closest advisors, the timing could not have been worse.
"For any peace plan to succeed, it has to be supported by Ukraine and it has to be supported by Europe," the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, told reporters on Thursday morning.
"The pressure must be on the aggressor, not on the victim. Rewarding aggression will only invite more of it."
The rewards for Russia’s aggression seemed clear, according to elements of the plan reported by other media.
The international community would recognise Crimea, invaded by Russia in 2014, as well as Luhansk and Donetsk as de facto Russian.
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be "frozen along the line of contact" and in exchange Russia would relinquish "other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions".
Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the part of Donetsk they currently control, rendering the area a "neutral demilitarised buffer zone", but one that would be internationally recognised as territory belonging to Russia (Russian forces would not enter the demilitarised zone).
Ukraine’s armed forces would be capped at 600,000, down from the current roughly one million under arms, and could no longer deploy long range missiles.
Ukraine would never be allowed to join NATO, and no NATO troops would be allowed to support Ukraine on its territory as part of any peacekeeping mission.
Ukraine would not be able to sue Russia for war reparations, or war crimes.
Russian would be made an official state language and special status would be granted to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Explained: What is Trump's 28-point Ukraine plan?
In exchange, the US would provide unspecified security guarantees.
"Concern about the plan will be acute in Ukraine and Europe," said Neil Melvin, director of international security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
"Early indications suggest that the agreement would enable Russia to achieve all the goals that it has set since the onset of its war in 2022 – territorial control of the Donbas and Crimea, substantial disarmament of Ukraine, disconnection of Kyiv from Euro-Atlantic security, and strategic Russian political and cultural leverage within Ukraine.
"This agenda would be politically impossible for President Zelensky to deliver after the human and economic costs of over three years of war and would likely mark the effective end of a sovereign Ukraine."
Following the foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on Thursday, Kaja Kallas attempted an unruffled demeanour.
"Ministers in the room were… calm about this because we have seen this before," she told reporters, "and because different peace plans cannot work if the Europeans and Ukrainians do not agree to this."
In Kyiv, a short time later, Mr Zelensky received the draft from US army secretary Daniel Driscoll, a close ally of vice-president JD Vance.
US Army spokesperson Colonel Dave Butler told reporters that Mr Driscoll and Mr Zelensky had "agreed on an aggressive timeline for signature".
Then the White House itself confirmed the plan, once again equally blaming Ukraine - at that moment mourning the loss of 26 civilians, including three children, killed by a Russian missile strike on an apartment block.
"[President Trump] has grown increasingly frustrated with both sides of this war, Russia and Ukraine alike, for their refusal to commit to a peace agreement," press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters.
By yesterday morning a deeper sense of panic had engulfed Europe, just as the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and the UK were en route to South Africa for the G20 summit.
The Trump administration appeared to be putting unbearable pressure on Mr Zelensky to sign the deal quickly.
Yesterday afternoon, President Trump told Fox Radio that Thanksgiving, next Thursday, was "an appropriate time".
Reuters, citing two sources, reported that the US would cut off weapons supplies and intelligence support unless Mr Zelensky signed.
Kaja Kallas issued a stronger statement, describing a "very dangerous moment for all".
Yesterday morning Mr Zelensky held hurried phone calls with the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to work on counter proposals.
Later yesterday afternoon, sources confirmed an alternative plan was taking shape.
On X, Mr Merz said: "The contact line must remain the basis for any talks," essentially that no Ukrainian territory be handed over before a ceasefire.
Who benefits financially from the plan?
Adding to the growing European unease was a proposal that $100bn of frozen Russian sovereign assets would be "invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine" with the US creaming off 50% of the profits.
Europe would add $100bn for Ukraine’s further reconstruction needs, with the remainder of the frozen Russian funds "invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas".
That fund would be aimed at "strengthening relations and increasing common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict".
In other words, Russia would benefit financially from its invasion of Ukraine.
Despite Europe’s best efforts to keep Donald Trump onside, and despite his sanctioning of two Russian oil companies, time and again, during phone calls with Mr Putin in February, March and October - and that summit in Alaska in August - the US president would inevitably soften his stance towards the Russian leader (a change in tack never prompted by a single Russian concession) and harden it towards Ukraine.
Not only that, Europe had been complying with Mr Trump’s repeated demands: to spend more on defence, to buy more US weapons for Ukraine, to commit to putting boots on the ground after any ceasefire, and to cutting back on imports of Russian energy.
If Europeans felt they were finally keeping the US president on Ukraine’s side, and that at the very least Europe would be at the table, the 28-point plan appeared to prove them wrong.
Indeed, a key reason why Europe has been determined to convert €140bn in immobilised Russian assets into a loan for Ukraine, in order to keep the country financially and militarily solvent for the next two years, was precisely because Mr Trump was progressively turning off the tap.
"By doing all those things," said one EU diplomat, "we are now at least somewhat better positioned in terms of what we can do on our own with Ukraine and for Ukraine."
Early yesterday, both Axios and the Wall Street Journal reported on the plan in more detail.
A second document had been presented to Ukraine, spelling out in greater detail the US security guarantee.
Any future "significant, deliberate, and sustained armed attack" by Russia "shall be regarded as an attack threatening the peace and security of the transatlantic community".
The Wall Street Journal reported that a response in such circumstances did not commit the US to military action - on offer was "intelligence and logistical assistance" or "other steps judged appropriate" after consultations with allies.
The guarantees would last ten years and could be extended.
There were further inducements to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
If the deal was adopted, Russia would be returned to the international fold, invited to rejoin the Group of Eight advanced countries, with sanctions lifted on a case-by-case basis.
Washington and Moscow would collaborate on artificial intelligence, data centres, energy deals and rare-earth mining in the Arctic.
It was, said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, a "win-win" situation.
The Kremlin remained coy.
On Thursday, Mr Putin’s spokesman Dmitri Peskov said Moscow had not received anything official from the US side, although contacts were ongoing.
He warned President Zelensky to do the "responsible" thing and accept the deal now.
At the heart of the Russian negotiations is Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund and a close ally of President Putin.
A Harvard-educated economist and Goldman Sachs investor who spent many years in the US, he returned to Russia in 2000 and was later appointed CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, established by the Kremlin to make the Russian economy less dependent on the fossil fuel industry.
According to reports, Mr Dmitriev has been at the centre of Russia’s charm offensive with the Trump administration, emphasising the financial dividends that both countries could enjoy if they could only get the Ukraine issue resolved.
Russia seeking to relitigate end of Cold War
Moscow insists the Alaska summit, at which President Trump rolled out the red carpet for Mr Putin - an indicted war criminal - provided the embryo of the 28-point plan.
Mr Dmitriev spent three days in Miami with Trump envoy Steve Witkoff at the end of October thrashing out the details.
Mr Witkoff then discussed the plan with President Zelensky's national security adviser Rustem Umerov at the weekend, although reports suggested it was only an oral briefing.
Mr Witkoff was then meant to fly to Istanbul on Wednesday to meet Mr Zelensky’s chief of staff Andriy Yermak, but that meeting was cancelled (both Mr Yermak and Mr Umerov have been implicated in the energy corruption scandal but have denied any wrongdoing).
Mr Dmitriev told Axios that the plan could be divided into four elements: peace in Ukraine, security guarantees, security in Europe and future US relations with Russia and Ukraine.
It was, he said, a "much broader framework" to bring about security, not just to Ukraine, but also "finally, lasting security to Europe", and addressing Russia’s security "concerns".
The Kremlin typically formulates such elements as solving the "root causes" of the conflict.
In reality, Russia wants to relitigate the end of the Cold War and President Putin’s own writings have made it clear that Moscow intends to reintegrate lands it believes are properly "Russian", and to turn former Soviet countries into client states.
On 17 December 2021, just two months before the invasion of Ukraine which Moscow swore was not going to happen, Russia issued an ultimatum to the West, that they agree to prevent Ukraine and any other ex-Soviet states from joining NATO, and roll-back deployments of NATO troops and weapons in central and eastern Europe.
While the Biden administration rejected that ultimatum outright, the Trump administration appears relaxed about the Russian narrative, so long as there are deals to be done on the Arctic and elsewhere.
Furthermore, conceding Luhansk and Donetsk would mean Ukraine surrendering its so-called Fortress Belt, an entrenched defensive zone of fortified towns, trenches and minefields built over more than a decade.
"It protects critical hubs like Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and prevents Russian forces from breaking into the open terrain west of the line, where Ukraine would struggle to build new defences quickly or hold ground effectively," said Natia Seskuria, associate fellow at RUSI.
"For Russia, capturing the Belt, or having it ceded to Moscow under a peace-deal forced on Ukraine, would eliminate one of Ukraine’s strongest military barriers, provide a valuable staging area for further potential Russian operations and deliver significant political leverage.
"Its fall, or concession in a deal, would put Ukraine at a major disadvantage in any future conflict and potentially provide Russia with more leverage to demand further territorial concessions over time."
Yesterday evening, President Zelensky made clear the stakes he was now facing.
In a stark televised address, which echoed his dimly-lit video phone message in the morning of Russia’s fullscale invasion, he called it "one of the most difficult moments of our history" in which Ukraine faced the "very difficult choice - either losing dignity or risk losing a major partner [the United States]".
It was clear he regarded the 28-point plan as unacceptable, one which - during an extremely harsh winter - would mean "life without freedom, without dignity, without justice".
Ukraine would work "calmly" with the US and its partners to find constructive solutions and offer alternatives, denying Russia any reason to claim that Ukraine did not want peace (in fact, the White House appeared to have made precisely that claim on Thursday evening).
EU diplomats, struggling to keep pace with events, reflected that the 28-point plan as reported may not be a definitive one, or at least one that had not commanded the support of the entire US administration.
Germany’s foreign minister Johann Wadephul told ZDF the plan was "a list of issues that urgently need to be discussed between Ukraine and Russia, not… a final plan".
Yet, the fear remains that the long-standing suspicion that Mr Trump’s innate dislike of Ukraine, and his long-time admiration for Vladimir Putin, has come to a final reckoning, with Russia the beneficiary.
"There's a lot of back and forth," mused another EU diplomat.
"On the US side, you can't exclude that this time it’s for real. But you also can't exclude that there will be another swing in a different situation."
A starker message on the twilight of the transatlantic relationship was delivered by Gabrielius Landsbergis, the former foreign minister of Lithuania.
"There is a glaringly obvious message for Europe in the 28-point plan," he posted on X.
"This is the end of the end.
"Europe is our continent, our future is decided here, not there.
"We aren’t poor, we have options, we can finally decide to assist Ukraine to the full extent of our very extensive capabilities, restore European dignity and defend Europe.
"Or we can continue to wait for the miracle we now know is not coming."
