The dynamics between the Trump administration and Europe on Ukraine have shifted, with the meeting of the so-called 'Coalition of the Willing' in Paris this week representing an important inflection point.
At that meeting, 35 countries - including Ireland (Taoiseach Micheál Martin joined by videolink) - gave political commitments on supporting Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement with Russia.
The host, French President Emmanuel Macron, is said to have told the gathering that it is ultimately up to each leader of the coalition to decide what to offer.
If US President Donald Trump's fawning welcome for Vladimir Putin in Alaska two weeks ago was a low point in Western morale, it also triggered a revival of European resolve to provide tougher moral and military support to Ukraine.
Within 48 hours of the Alaska summit, seven key European figures - Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, French President Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte - jetted to the White House to steer Mr Trump away from any notion of Ukraine handing over swathes of the Donbas to Russia, what had seemed a cheap win for Mr Putin at the Alaska meeting.
Instead, the focus switched to security guarantees for Ukraine. That, say officials briefed on the White House gathering, has put life back in the 'Coalition of the Willing', which had been treading water since the spring.
Keeping the US President on Europe’s side has required a squeamish blend of flattery and acquiescence, but the muscular antipathy towards the United States displayed by China, Russia and India at the Shanghai Cooperation summit in Beijing this week angered Mr Trump and further shifted the dial on Ukraine.
It is understood Mr Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff told leaders in Paris - after he spoke by phone to the US president - that his boss was "very upset" about the display in China, and that Russia was "going in the wrong direction".
If there are to be peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, which the Trump-Putin dialogue is ostensibly all about, then Ukraine must have the strongest security guarantees ready to go in advance of those talks, say officials.
And because Moscow is showing no appetite for a ceasefire, or a bilateral meeting between Mr Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Europe wants Mr Trump to pressurise the Kremlin by, among other things, sanctioning countries supporting the Russian war effort through oil purchases and other means.
The message from the US President to the coalition meeting in Paris, conveyed through Mr Witkoff, was "if you want me to put more pressure on Putin through secondary sanctions I want Europeans to be part of sanctions as well".
EU sanctions on Russia have, needless to say, been much more significant than US sanctions since the full-scale invasion in 2022: geographic proximity meant the trade volumes were always greater.
EU exports to Russia have fallen by 61% since the war started, while imports of Russian goods have slumped by 89%, meaning bilateral trade that was worth €257.5 billion before the invasion is now worth €67.5bn, the bulk of which is Russian fossil fuel exports.
President Trump wants Europe to do more on the latter and has complained that European demands for US secondary sanctions - i.e., on countries trading with Russia - are hypocritical if the EU is still spending €1.7bn on Russian energy every month.
EU officials accept the criticism, but argue that a broad phase out of Russian fossil fuels is under way, and has been hampered by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia, the former being Mr Trump’s closest ally in Europe.
So far, the EU has embarked on a full phase out of Russian coal, crude oil and pipeline gas, with Nord Stream one and two both under sanction.
The Druzhba oil pipeline to the north is not formally sanctioned, but Poland and Germany have agreed not to use it; the Druzhba pipeline to the south is the conduit for the oil that Hungary and Slovakia complain should keep flowing.
Russian exports of Liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the EU are actually increasing, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), with €92bn worth of Russian LNG entering European ports this year, the vast majority in Spain, France and Belgium.
Officials point out that these figures indicate LNG arriving in EU ports, but which is often shipped further afield.
Some member states buy Russian LNG via long-term contracts.
Because LNG has been subject to EU trade measures, rather than sanctions, there has been a risk of litigation if those countries breach the contracts.
However, officials say that if the EU switches to full-scale sanctions on LNG, then member states can claim force majeure and end the contracts. Overall, Europe wants to end all imports of Russian LNG by the end of 2026.
The other ongoing headache is the continued flow of Russian crude oil, a major source of war-related revenue.
In December 2022, the G7 agreed a price cap of $60 (€51) per barrel on Russian oil in order to starve Moscow of income, but not in ways that would push up the price of oil on the world market.
The plan was to enforce the price cap via insurance tools: since most of the world’s shipping is insured through Lloyd’s of London, Britain’s membership of the G7, in theory, meant ships would be deterred from shipping oil sold above the price cap.
However, Russia circumvented this by creating a shadow fleet of ageing, uninsured and frequently reflagged vessels. EU officials now admit that the volume of illicit Russian crude being exported is roughly the same as pre-invasion levels, with 444 vessels listed as being part of the shadow fleet.
With the global price of oil falling this year to levels close to the price cap, the EU has unilaterally agreed a new cap of $47.60 per barrel, which takes effect this month.
Following a phone call between Ms von der Leyen and US Vice President JD Vance on Thursday evening, both sides agreed to set up teams to work together on tightening sanctions on Russian fossil fuels.
If that renewed sanctions effort bears fruit and convinces Mr Putin to come to the table, what will the security guarantees for Ukraine look like?
EU officials say the Trump administration acknowledges that there can be no revisiting of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, when Ukraine agreed to give up its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal in return for Russian assurances (not "guarantees") that it would respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
European officials talk of three pillars: the first being the Ukrainian armed forces, which must have no limits on armaments, mobilisation and deployment (the contact line is 1,200km long and due to the primacy of drones, which are difficult to spot by technology alone, Kyiv will insist on having large numbers of troops available).
The second pillar is a "reassurance" force of international peacekeepers; the third being the EU’s own defence posture, with a huge ramping up of military spending, including joint projects between EU member states and Ukraine’s indigenous and now highly efficient arms industry.
The logic is that all three combined would make Russia think twice about invading Ukraine again.
Since the Alaska summit, British, French and US officials are understood to have been working on detailed, concrete plans in close coordination with SACEUR, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, including the involvement of five-star generals.
This planning involves building a 3D picture of what a reassurance force would look like - across land, air and sea - with the meeting in Paris representing a political commitment to turn that plan into military reality in the event of a peace agreement.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary general, has warned that the security guarantees should be ready to go first.
"Without this concrete guarantee of security," he wrote in the Financial Times this week, "Moscow’s forces will simply use any future ceasefire as an opportunity to rest and re-arm.
"Yet while a 'coalition of the willing’ led by the UK and France has been discussed for months, European security guarantees are being treated as something to be included in a final peace deal, rather than as a prerequisite to such an agreement.
"This thinking must be turned on its head."
Either way, it is clear President Trump wants to see crystallised European security guarantees in place before he will commit to a US backstop, which has been taken to mean air defences, intelligence, satellite imagery and the use of transport planes.
The politics at national level is fraught.
It is understood Italy is keeping its counsel on what commitment it will make, while Poland would prefer to act as a logistics backbone.
The shaky German coalition has slapped down any talk of a troop commitment, and Mr Merz is said to be cautious, given that any fresh German offer will require a Bundestag mandate. EU sources suggest that in the event of a ceasefire, Mr Merz will possibly be more emboldened to test the Bundestag’s willingness.
All of this remains contingent on Russia playing ball.
On Friday, President Putin told a conference in Vladivostok that any foreign troops in Ukraine, while the fighting was ongoing, would be regarded as "legitimate" targets (and would be "defeated"); if there was a "long-term solution", he said, then there would be no reason for any international troops on the territory of Ukraine.
Senior EU sources say the Trump administration is sanguine about Mr Putin’s threats and believes that the Russian president will eventually accept foreign troops as part of a reassurance force (EU officials remain unconvinced).
While Russia has been gaining ground incrementally, its summer offensive has been deemed a failure, with massive casualties (although the death and injury rate among Russian troops has fallen due to the increased use of drones).
While Moscow said EU sanctions are not working, officials point out that at every meeting between Russian and US officials, sanctions relief is their first demand.
This weekend, the European Commission will contact member states on the 19th EU sanctions package.
