In the aftermath of Brexit, EU defence floats to the surface, writes RTÉ’s Europe Editor Tony Connelly.
In the foamy aftermath of Brexit one idea on how the rest of the European Union should respond has quickly floated to the surface: defence.
Suddenly, with the UK leaving the EU, the issue of deeper defence co-operation, long resisted by Britain, is open for discussion.
This has obvious implications for Ireland, and given the foment over the Apple decision and its alleged stomping on the country’s tax sovereignty, it will be a tricky one for the Government.
For many voters Ireland’s neutrality is as sacred a red line as tax, and any hint that another shibboleth of Government policy is being unpicked and the minority administration could find itself on the backfoot.
Nigel Farage, the former leader of UKIP, has already been quick to trumpet that the EU Army he warned about during the British referendum campaign is now on its way, yet another reason, he declared, that people were right to vote for Brexit.
The reality, however, is far different.
Greater co-operation is now being talked about. France and Germany issued a couple of position papers ahead of the Bratislava summit of the 27 EU leaders (excluding the UK), one of which says it’s “high time to strengthen our solidarity and European capacities in defence, to more effectively protect our borders and EU citizens, and to contribute to peace and stability in our neighbourhood.”
Even before Brexit, EU leaders have been discussing how better to optimise the defence spending of individual member states in order to meet the perceived threats and challenges to Europe, mostly emerging in North Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East.
The threats can roughly be headlined under terrorism, regional instability, migration crises, illegal arms proliferation etc.
The first discussions on defence after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect were held during the EU summit in December 2013. Then in June 2015, EU leaders agreed that Europe needed “a more effective, visible and result-oriented Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the further development of both civilian and military capabilities and the strengthening of Europe’s defence industry, including SMEs.”
The emphasis would be on encouraging more defence spending, better use of existing resources, looking at a possible future defence research and technology programme, and deepening co-operation between member states to ensure greater inter-operability of military hardware.
There would also be “intensifying partnerships” with the United Nations, NATO, the Oganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Africa Union with a view to preventing and managing crises.
As a further result of these commitments, EU leaders invited the bloc’s High Representative for Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini to draw up a new Global Strategy for Europe.
That was duly published in June. Ms Mogherini said the EU needed a bolder security presence on the world stage. “When it comes to collective defense,” she said, “NATO remains the primary framework for most member states…” but “…as Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security.”
The idea would be to give Europe greater “autonomy” to act in a crisis beyond automatically resorting to NATO.
“While NATO exists to defend its members — most of which are European — from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary,” she said.
A few days later the EU and NATO issued a joint declaration at a summit in Warsaw, promising greater co-operation to confront the threats of “hybrid” and “cyber” warfare - ie, the threat posed by Russia - and the challenges of illegal migration.
Beyond the Mogherini and NATO processes, we’re also expecting fresh proposals from European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker this Autumn.
Again, the proposals will look at ways to support the defence industry in Europe. Experts believe the level of co-operation between member states is nowhere near where it should be.
“The 28 EU member states collectively spent some €200 billion on defense in 2015, but much is wasted,” says Daniel Keohane, senior researcher at the Centre for Security Studies at ETH Zürich. “For example, there are nineteen different types of armoured infantry fighting vehicles across the EU, while the United States has one.”
As such, France and Germany are recommending that more of the costs of logistics, medical assistance and satellite reconnaissance be shared, while Italy is proposing tax breaks for joint procurement programmes taken up by groups of member states.
But it is another idea, being circulated by like-minded countries, which have quickened the pulse of those who worry about some kind of common EU defence policy.
Under Articles 43, 43 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, member states can group together under the concept of what is called “Permanent Structured Cooperation” or PESCO for short.
Typically they could pool or harmonise military resources, capabilities, training, investment and logistics in order to carry out a mission at the request of the United Nations, one which could last at least 120 days.
Any such mission would take place “without prejudice to undertakings … within NATO.”
So, any Franco-German proposals on deeper defence co-operation would be effectively using elements of the EU Treaty which have yet been put to use. Italy even foresees something similar to the Schengen Agreement, the borderless area agreed by a group of member states which was initially outside the realm of the EU.
The critics, namely Carl Bildt, the former Swedish Prime Minister and one time UN special envoy to the Balkans, say that any move towards PESCOs would undermine the existence of EU Battlegroups.
These were set up under the Irish presidency of the EU in 2004 in order to provide Europe with a robust intervention force, on a rotating basis, which could quickly intervene in a conflict in order to secure an area which would then be made safe for a broader UN peacekeeping operation.
The idea was actually modelled on a French intervention in Congo, when they seized an airport to make it safe to bring in humanitarian supplies.
Ireland has, of course, been involved with the Nordic Battlegroup alongside Swedish and Finnish troops. The problem with the EU Battlegroups is that, so far, they have never been used.
There was a plan to launch a battlegroup in 2008 in Eastern Congo with the UK and Germany as the leading actors. However, at the time the new US president Barak Obama wanted both countries to take a more active role in Afghanistan and the EU Battlegroup plan was shelved.
So what implications do any of these defence “processes” have for Ireland?
The Irish Government will argue that the country’s neutrality is copper-fastened by the legal protocols respecting Ireland’s traditional stance which were attached to the Lisbon Treaty.
The development of any structured co-operation through PESCOs is open to any member state who wishes to take part, so there would be no obligation on Ireland to get involved.
Where the Government would have a concern is as follows. Dublin will argue that if any of these clusters of countries undertake a mission on behalf of the EU, under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), then it would have to act with the unanimous support of all 27 member states, including Ireland.
The actual creation of PESCOs would, in any case, be done through a Qualified Majority Vote by member states (ie, with no veto), but the view in government circles would be that if Ireland is not taking part in any such “structured co-operation” then it would be politically difficult for the government to vote to block it.
The post-Brexit reality means, however, that Ireland will be more exposed in nailing its colours to the mast. In the past the Government could hide behind Britain in sensitive areas, such as taxation and defence.
Britain has always blocked any talk of clusters of member states co-operating militarily. In London’s view this threatened the primacy of NATO, notwithstanding the Treaty reassurances to the contrary. Ireland has been cool on PESCOs, but for different reasons.
With the UK leaving, Ireland will have to be more assertive in its beliefs.
Another issue that London blocked was the idea of a permanent HQ for any European CSDP missions, again because Britain felt it would undermine NATO.
At present each mission has an ad hoc military headquarters. The French and Germans want a permanent operational seat based in Brussels.
Again, this will be something the Irish Government will have to address. Ireland has taken part in a number of CSDP missions: in Chad in 2009 with over 100 personnel, in Somalia, where two Irish generals were force commanders, and in the training mission in Mali, where between 13 and 18 Irish troops are taking part.
The Government may take the view that having a permanent planning base in one location may make sense.
They may also take the view that having greater defence research, development and investment decisions co-ordinated by member states also makes sense: if Ireland’s armed forces are to use military hardware, why should it not fit into the spectrum of equipment used by other member states, especially if, under the triple-lock, Ireland is perfectly willing to take part in EU military missions abroad.
What the Government is likely to resist, however, is any requirement for Ireland to adhere to targets on defence spending.
Here it has the guarantee enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty Protocols. The Protocol on military neutrality reads: “[any move towards a common defence] does not affect the right of Ireland or any other Member State to determine the nature and volume of its defence and security expenditure and the nature of its defence capabilities.”
The Protocol also confirms that it would entirely be up to Ireland on whether or not it chose to participate in “permanent structured cooperation” or indeed in any military operation, and insists that “The Treaty of Lisbon does not provide for the creation of a European Army.”
These are the legal safeguards. The politics is a different matter.
There has not been much full-blooded discussion of European defence since the second Lisbon referendum. Nor has there been any major shock to the system when Ireland participates in any of its CSDP missions.
But we are in a minority Government situation, and the febrile mood has yet to be tested.
So far, these “processes” are at an early stage. Experts believe that in themselves PESCOs will be politically and logistically fraught, and could take years to get off the ground.
However, it’s also pretty certain that NATO would like the EU to take on more of the burden in its own neighbourhood, such as Operation Sophia which is the EU’s anti-migrant smuggling operation in the Mediterranean.
There will be meetings at formal and informal level involving EU defence and foreign ministers over the next few months, and EU leaders are likely to address the issue during their summit in Brussels in December.
There is no doubt that the awkward partner - the UK - is heading for the door, and that means previously stalled initiatives on defence are now live again.
It also seems that the post-Brexit zeitgeist is favourable towards more candid discussions on security and defence, if the issue of terrorism is part of that ambit. The presidents of the European Council and Commission are keenly aware that the EU has to be seen to be delivering on issues that citizens take seriously, and following the horrendous attacks in Brussels, Paris and Nice, having a greater EU role in external security is one such area.
That means the Irish Government will have to articulate its views more clearly when the time comes.
By Europe Editor Tony Connelly
