How the Anglo Irish Agreement came about 40 years ago this week

Analysis: The signing of the Agreement facilitated the early stages of the Northern Ireland peace process and, ultimately, the Good Friday Agreement

By Stephen Kelly, Liverpool Hope University

The origins of the Anglo-Irish Agreement date back to a series of clandestine negotiations between British and Irish policymakers. This was initially under the banner of the David Goodall-Michael Lillis talks, which convened in the summer of 1983, and subsequently under the auspices of the Robert Armstrong-Dermot Nally framework talks, beginning in February 1984.

By the summer of 1985, as the Anglo-Irish negotiations entered a critical stage, UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher presented Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald with a secret proposal regarding a 'possible role for the Irish Government in future arrangements for Northern Ireland'. This included providing the Irish with a ‘consultative role’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland. After a further round of exhaustive talks, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was eventually signed at Hillsborough Castle, Co. Down on 15 November 1985.

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From RTÉ Archives, RTÉ News footage of official signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement at Hillsborough Castle, Co Down on 15 November 1985

'A brilliant morning'

Early on the morning of 15 November, Thatcher and her entourage flew into RAF Aldergrove in Northern Ireland and were transported by helicopter to Hillsborough Castle. Reflecting on the significance of the occasion, David Goodall, deputy secretary to the U.K. cabinet, fondly remembered the journey from London to Hillsborough Castle. It was ‘a brilliant morning’, he recalled, ‘as we came over Northern Ireland, the sky a clear blue, the small fields emerald, the golden autumn trees casting long morning shadows and frost still lying in sliver patches where the sun had yet to melt it’.

'I had no illusion about the difficulties, friction and violence which lay ahead; but I believed that the Agreement could gradually drain some of the bitterness out of the British-Irish relationship and create the basic geometry for an eventual settlement.

At 11.30am, Thatcher held a one-hour tete-ã-tete with FitzGerald, at which both leaders confirmed their determination "to make it succeed". Thatcher noted "I am entering the Agreement in total good faith. I mean what I say". FitzGerald, likewise, said he was "totally with you in this approach". After lunch, the formal signing ceremony was convened at 2pm.

From RTÉ Archives, RTÉ News footage of the press conference with Garret FitzGerald and Margaret Thatcher following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on 15 November 1985

What was in the Agreement?

Four central principles underpinned the Agreement

That both governments emphatically rejected the use of violence and all those who support it;

A binding affirmation that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of its people;

A recognition that if in the future a majority formally consented to a united Ireland, the two governments would support legislation accordingly; and lastly

The establishment, within the framework of the AIIC, of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference concerned both with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of Ireland.

Article 1 of the Agreement dealt with the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the principle of consent. The two governments affirmed that ‘any changes in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’. A commitment was also reached that ‘if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish’.

From RTÉ Archives, Jim Dougal reports for RTÉ News in 1985 on Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams accusing the Irish government of accepting responsibility for repression in the North by signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

From London’s perspective, this was a significant achievement. The Irish government, in effect, went further than it ever had before in recognising that Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom. Indeed, under the terms of the Agreement, this concession on behalf of Dublin was embodied for the ‘first time in a binding international agreement’.

Articles 2, 3 and 4 dealt with the proposed establishment of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference. This conference provided the Republic of Ireland with a mechanism to put forward views and proposals ‘on specific areas of administration and policy’ in relation to Northern Ireland. They included political, security, legal matters (including the administration of justice) and the promotion of cross-border security. It would operate under ‘a joint chairmanship’ of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland and a minister appointed by the Irish government.

Lastly, Article 12 recognised that if and when the parliaments in Dublin and London agreed to establish an Anglo-Irish parliamentary body ‘of the kind adumbrated’ in the Anglo-Irish joint study reports of November 1981, the two governments agreed to support this measure.

From RTÉ Archives, Caroline Erskine reports for RTÉ News on Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald's address on the Anglo-Irish Agreement to delegations from the US Congress and European Parliament at Dublin Castle in January 1986

FitzGerald’s reaction

Throughout Charles Haughey's time as Taoiseach in the early 1980s, he had regularly demanded support from the UK government for an Anglo-Irish parliamentary body (or tier), "but had been continually rebuffed". One, therefore, can appreciate the extent to which the Anglo-Irish Agreement was a genuine triumph for FitzGerald.

Not only had the Taoiseach wrestled support from Thatcher for the establishment of such a parliamentary body, but the creation of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference meant the UK government now agreed to permit Dublin a 'consultative' role in the affairs of Northern Ireland for the first time since the enactment of partition in 1920. It, therefore, should come as no surprise to learn that FitzGerald basked in the glory following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (the Agreement has been described as his "greatest achievement").

Thatcher’s reaction

Despite the pomp and ceremony, Thatcher was in a less than jubilant mood. In fact, she regretted signing the Accord almost immediately. Privately, she protested that the Irish "have all the glory. We have all the problems".

From RTÉ Archives, Jim Dougal reports for RTÉ News on the publication of a review of the working of the Anglo-Irish Conference in May 1989

So why did Thatcher agree to put pen to paper in the first place? Although an argument has emerged within the relevant literature that American pressure forced her to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the available archival documentation paints a very different picture. Indeed, Thatcher herself has a part to play in this misconception. Somewhat disingenuously, in the years following the signing of the Agreement, she was reported as privately claiming "it was the pressure from the Americans that made me sign the Agreement".

We should tread carefully when considering this hypothesis. While Thatcher’s blossoming relationship with US president Ronald Reagan certainly played a part in her decision to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it is entirely inaccurate to state that this was her primary reason. In truth, the scale of US involvement has been overplayed. As Thatcher’s cabinet secretary, Robert Armstrong subsequently confirmed in a 2015 interview with this author, "one should not place too much emphasis on this point". While Reagan certainly encouraged Thatcher to reach an agreement, she was "like any politician, she preferred to succeed rather than to fail".

In fact, three more prominent factors compelled Thatcher to support the Agreement. Firstly (and this is often overlooked), Thatcher’s motivations were driven by a genuine desire to promote peace, stability and reconciliation between the two major traditions, in the hope of achieving a devolved government in Northern Ireland. Following Thatcher’s emphatic success at the 1983 UK general election, she felt that Northern Ireland was ‘hanging over’ her from her first administration. Back in office and with a comfortable parliamentary majority, she was now determined to (in her own words) ‘do something’ about Northern Ireland.

From RTÉ Archives, Michael Fisher reports for RTÉ News on Unionist protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement in Belfast in January 1986

Secondly, Thatcher had come under increasing pressure in the weeks, months, indeed years, leading to the signing of the Agreement to concede to the Irish their request for a ‘consultative role’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland. This came from Sir Geoffrey Howe, her secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs and her leading civil servants, namely, Charles Powell and Robert Armstrong. For example, in a letter to Thatcher, dated 30 October 1985, Powell noted that, ‘… failure to go ahead now [with the Anglo-Irish Agreement] would be a great disappointment to the Americans’ (Thatcher underscored this line, invariably signifying her approval).

Lastly, by signing the Agreement, Thatcher hoped it would help provide a security solution to the Northern Ireland conflict by isolating the terrorists and formalising security cooperation between Dublin and London. To borrow Seán Donlon's critique, a central reason why Thatcher agreed to place her weight behind the Agreement was that she had "an expectation that signing the Agreement would be like waving a magic wand – that the security situation would immediately be improved, that the Provisionals would be side-lined".

The Agreement's legacy today

For British and Irish policymakers alike, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement marked a significant breakthrough in Anglo-Irish relations and a step towards finding a long-term solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland. The Agreement remains "unique" in international relations as a means to deal with "a region that had been historically disputed between two sovereign governments and between the two main communities in the conflict there".

Without Thatcher's support, the Agreement would never have been signed

The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement brought to fruition two and a half years of secret ‘cut and thrust’ negotiations between the UK and Irish government in relation to Northern Ireland and more broadly the future relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, to use Goodall’s description.

Leaving aside the motivations for why Thatcher decided to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement, one point is indisputable: without her support, the Agreement would never have been signed. She was the lynchpin of the entire enterprise. Although Thatcher herself never saw it this way, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was arguably one of her finest diplomatic achievements, ranking alongside the Zimbabwe agreement.

The establishment of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, under the terms of the Accord, streamlined Dublin-London relations at the official and governmental levels, providing a platform for dialogue that seemed unimaginable only a few years previously. The Anglo-Irish Agreement can be viewed as playing a crucial role in facilitating the early stages of the Northern Ireland peace process, which culminated in the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998.

The contents of this article are sourced from the author's 2021 book Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland conflict, 1975-1990 (Bloomsbury).

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Prof Stephen Kelly is Head of the School of Humanities and Professor of Modern Irish History and British-Irish Relations at Liverpool Hope University.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent or reflect the views of RTÉ