Analysis: The story behind Eamon de Valera's response to the declaration of an Irish Republic 75 years ago today
By Stephen Kelly, Liverpool Hope University
During a state visit to Canada in September 1948, Taoiseach John A. Costello confirmed reports that the First-Inter Party government intended to repeal the External Relations Act (1936) and Ireland would be leaving the Commonwealth. In November 1948, the Irish Government passed the Republic of Ireland Act. which declared that the description of the state would be the Republic of Ireland (though the official name of the state remained Ireland or Éire in Irish).
Costello, Seán MacBride and William Norton were leading figures in the main coalition parties, Fine Gael, Clann na Poblachta and Labour. All had been bitter opponents of the External Relations Act which had been passed by the Fianna Fáil government in 1936.
Their principal area of contention was that this act recognised the King as the symbol of co-operation within the Commonwealth and confirmed certain of his functions in external affairs. For Fine Gael, in particular, this announcement was a means to which the party finally removed the stain of its previous period in government in the 1920s when, as Cumann na nGaedheal, it had acquired a reputation as the pro-British party and of supporting partition.
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From RTÉ Archives, Minister for External Affairs Seán MacBride TD addressing the nation on April 18th 1949, the day Ireland officially became a Republic
While Éamon De Valera's biographers record that he "rejoiced as one who saw in the action of the government the ending of a long controversy", he privately believed that the First Inter-Party Government's decision was not necessary. De Valera argued that Ireland was at this moment a Republic in all but name, at least. "There is no King of the state either internally or externally", he wrote at the time, "our executive authority and power internal and external lies with the government".
Writing to Costello in early April 1948, De Valera refused an offer from the First Inter-Party government to deliver an address to mark the coming into operation of the Republic of Ireland Act, scheduled for April 18th 1948. His reluctance was based on the premise that he could never participate ˜in any such ventures" as the Act did not merit a national celebration. He believed that "complete freedom could not be obtained by the blowing of trumpets and the firing of guns".
De Valera had strong feelings against celebrating any political or constitutional event short of the full reunification of the whole island as a Republic. At a meeting of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party, he instructed deputies to oppose the amendment of the Republic of Ireland Act, which provided for the "institution of a national holiday on the day of the coming of the Bill into operation". The very use of the name "Republic" agitated de Valera as he felt that the term was sacred and could only be used when the entire island of Ireland was united.
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From RTÉ Radio 1's History Show. Myles Dungan and guests discuss the the long and remarkable career of Éamon De Valera, the most dominant political figure of 20th century Ireland
The UK government expressed their bemusement of the First Inter-Party Government's handling of the entire affair. Prime minister Clement Attlee privately wrote that the Republic of Ireland Act would only increase the "difficulty in arriving at any agreement on the partition question". Indeed, writing in the 1960s the Earl of Longford (formerly Lord Pakenham), a former leading British Labour MP and co-author of De Valera's semi-official biography in 1970, described the affair as merely "an unhappy accident of history".
Significantly, the First Inter-Party Government's decision compelled a reluctant Labour government in Britain to introduce the Ireland Act in May 1949. This counter legislation came as a bitter blow to De Valera. The doctrine of consent, which was enshrined within the Act, reassured Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the United Kingdom and effectively gave Ulster Unionists a veto over Irish unity.
London's wish to introduce the Ireland Act in May 1949 was built on two salient points. The first was in direct response to the Irish government's official declaration of the Republic of Ireland Act the previous April, which resulted in intensive lobbying from Ulster Unionists for the British to make a counter-declaration. The second was due to Dublin's decision not to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in January 1949.
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From RTÉ Archives, one of a number of recordings made at a Republic Day ceremony in O'Connell Street, Dublin, to mark the occasion of Ireland becoming a republic in 1949
The First Inter-Party Government's decision to reject the offer of joining NATO was based on the premise that any military alliance involving the British," who the Irish maintained were responsible for partition" was entirely "repugnant and unacceptable" to the Irish people. De Valera agreed, having publicly announced that Fianna Fáil would only support Ireland's involvement in NATO if Ireland was united. For London, Dublin's refusal to participate in NATO made it impossible for Whitehall to retain a detached attitude on partition, as Ireland's refusal had implications for the wider security question of defending the North Atlantic.
De Valera was in London at the time of the declaration and the statement seemed to perturb him immensely. He felt that the Republic of Ireland Act was further evidence of the poisoning effect of partition on Anglo-Irish relations. On the day of its announcement, he delivered a speech at Fleet Street in London. Placing the blame squarely on the UK government, he passionately declared "you have carved up our country".
The Republic of Ireland Act effectively saw the passing of the veto on Irish unity from London to the custody of the Ulster Unionists. De Valera believed that the Act was an "ingenious system" providing the British with two vetoes on Irish unity; the first through the London parliament, the second through Belfast.
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From RTÉ Radio 1's DocArchive, what did the declaration of a republic mean for Irishmen and women? (first broadcast 1949)
Writing privately to Attlee, de Valera passionately compared Britain's justification for a partitioned Ireland to that of Hitler's rationale for invading Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland. The British maintenance of partition, he wrote, "undermined the morale" of Irishmen and women and all Europeans.
Significantly, the introduction of the Ireland Act forced de Valera to acknowledge that his use of propaganda to help end partition had proved futile. Not since the introduction of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 had partition been so resolutely confirmed. From this moment onwards, arguably as never before, De Valera was forced to concede that the ending of partition was a long-term aspiration rather than a medium-term objective.
De Valera's use of propaganda as a tool to preach the injustice of partition was a policy of futility and he never again embarked on an international anti-partition tour. He had learned a valuable lesson that propaganda only offered superficial success.
This article is based on the author's book Fianna Fáil, Partition and Northern Ireland, 1926-1971
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Prof Stephen Kelly is Professor of Modern Irish History and British-Irish Relations at the School of Humanities at Liverpool Hope University.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent or reflect the views of RTÉ
