Ukraine war: how will the next few months unfold?

Analysis: while the outcome of the war is hard to predict, neither side seems currently placed to inflict decisive damage on the other

As we approach the first anniversary of the beginning of the war in Ukraine, there is much speculation as to what the next few months will bring. There is considerable debate as to whether either or both sides will mount major offensives by the end of March 2023.

The most dramatic event of late 2022 was Russia's withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnieper at Kherson in November and this was heralded by some western pundits as a sign of imminent Russian collapse. Conversely, it has allowed Russian forces to shorten their defensive lines and simplify logistical arrangements.

The partial mobilisation of reserves has further allowed Russia to deploy these second-line troops into defensive positions, while at the same time allowing for the redeployment of more seasoned and regular units into manoeuvre formations. At this current time, there are large formations of Russian troops that are uncommitted to the fight and predicting how these formations will be used is developing in an obsession for western military analysts.

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From RTÉ Radio 1's Morning Ireland, Dr. Mike Martin, Senior War Studies Fellow at King's College London, on Russia firing missiles at Ukraine following the announcement of Western pledges of tanks to Kyiv

The late autumn and winter weather has effectively shut down major operations and we have seen the development of positional, and attritional, warfare. To a considerable extent, this suits the Russian forces, who have an estimated 9:1 advantage in artillery, which is used to lay down large-scale area artillery "fires". There is mounting evidence that Russian forces are becoming more effective in counter-battery fires and have had success in destroying Ukrainian artillery. For Ukrainian forces, with finite manpower and equipment resources, this is a punishing phase of operations.

In recent weeks, we have also seen the increased use of forces associated with the Wagner Group. These are often dismissed in western media as ex-convicts and mercenaries and their use has been associated with a perceived deterioration in Russian capacity and battlefield atrocities. It could also be argued that they have brought a level of flexibility to the overall Russian army which, dogged by traditional command and control systems, has proved to be less than dynamic thus far.

How healthy the interface is between the Wagner forces and Russian army command is less easy to define and there are indications that Wagner does not enjoy full access to Russian combat support services. Yet they have had some success at Soledar and have been heavily committed to the fighting at Bakhmut.

From RTÉ Radio 1's Drivetime, who are the Wagner Group? Explainer from Borzou Daragahi, International Correspondent for The Independent

Indeed, it is likely that the fighting at Bakhmut will shape the next major moves in eastern Ukraine. It is an important transportation hub and sits astride a nexus of road networks. It is also a key position for the Ukrainian defensive lines in the Donetsk Oblast, which run from Slavyansk in the east to Lysychansk in the west.

Looking across the wider eastern front, it is also apparent that the current contact line, which runs from the east of Kharkov, southwards to Donetsk, forms a dangerous salient into Russian-controlled territory. Simultaneous Russian attacks from the north towards Izyum and, from the south, towards Pavlograd, would, if successful, cut off and encircle Ukrainian formations.

Following historic examples, Russia has lost heavily in its initial, rash, attempt at a decisive early victory, but has now settled into a methodological, positional type of warfare that advantages its superiority in artillery firepower. Alongside that, they are engaged in an extensive air campaign, aimed at destroying infrastructure, killing civilians and eroding support for the Zelensky government.

From RTÉ Radio1's Drivetime, CNN's Ben Wedeman reports from the frontline at Bakhmut

This is why there has been so much heat in recent international discussions about sending further military aid as this comes at a particular pinch point for Ukraine. Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has seen several iterations of its army seriously impacted, first in the open war of movement of the early weeks and then in the attritional, defensive slog of late 2022. Ukraine is sensitive to its manpower issues and, having lost military equipment, it now needs a rapid resupply in order to hold its own in coming battles.

It now appears that Germany, Britain and the US have all decided to send consignments of main battle tanks to Ukraine. These will include American Abrams tanks, the British Challenger 2 and the German Leopard 2 tank.

The discussion around the Leopard 2 has drawn much attention due to Germany's seeming reluctance to release any of their own tanks, or to sanction the use of tanks that had been sold to Poland and other countries. There were various reasons for Chancellor Olaf Schloz's reluctance, ranging from an unwillingness to give away German combat capacity, to fears of how this escalation will be perceived by Russia. It became obvious in recent weeks that both the German government and public have reservations about sending German tanks to Ukraine, a country that was so ravaged by combat in the Second World War.

From RTÉ Radio 1's News At One, reaction to German decision to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine from Fabrice Pothier, Chief Executive of Rasmussen Global political consultancy and Kyiv-based journalist Emmanuelle Chaze.

The prime place given to the Leopard 2 in these discussions is due to the fact that there are large numbers of this highly-regarded tank that are relatively proximate to Ukraine. The Leopard 2 series began production in the late 1970s and, as a third generation main battle tank, it is seen as being more advanced in terms of design and its integrated technology.

The later Leopard 2 A5 version was redesigned to lower its profile and incorporates a narrow, wedge-shaped turret, which mounts a 120mm gun. This makes for a lower target on the battlefield and the main gun has an advanced fire control system, night-vision and laser range-finding. Its twin V12 turbo diesel allows for a top speed of 68kmh to a maximum range of 500km. The armour protection has been upgraded several times in the Leopard series’ lifetime, potentially making it a resilient tank on the battlefield.

If its success as a design can be indicated by export orders, it is worth noting that the Leopard II has been evaluated and purchased in the hundreds by many countries across Europe including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Hungary and Spain among many others. It is also in use further afield in Canada, Turkey, Indonesia etc. The Leopard 2 series is also backed up by ongoing R+D, tactical experimentation and large supplies of spare parts.

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From France 24 News, report on the Leopard 2 tank

A consignment of Leopard 2s would undoubtedly raise Ukraine’s combat capacity in the coming months and act as a force-multiplier for Ukrainian tank formations. It would outclass many of the Russian tank variants still in use and it was actually designed to counter Soviet tanks in the context of the Cold War.

But a note of caution needs to be factored in: these tanks cannot simply be driven "off the lot" and into combat. Their crews will need to undergo intensive training. In NATO armies, such training would be carried out over a number of months and this programme will now have to be seriously truncated. The maintenance of these main battle tanks also requires significant training and a supply of specific spare parts. They are totally different to the Soviet-designed tanks that the Ukrainian army is used to operating and maintaining.

Another significant issue is the airpower question. If Russia controls the airspace over Ukraine, then these new tanks and Ukraine's existing armoured formations are vulnerable to air and missile attack. This consideration is no doubt behind Ukraine's repeated requests for more air defence systems.

From RTÉ Radio 1's Drivetime, what impact will Leopard tanks have on the war in Ukraine?

In overall strategic terms, they cannot arrive soon enough for Ukraine. At the moment, the initiative seems to rest with Russia and an offensive is likely. In that context, the Leopard 2s and other main battle tanks would play a key role in Ukrainian defensive actions and counterattacks.

How the war unfolds in 2023 is harder to predict. Neither side seems currently placed to inflict decisive damage on the other. For Ukraine, it could be a question of carrying out a successful defence to blunt Russian offensives and, from there, perhaps move towards peace talks.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent or reflect the views of RTÉ

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