At the start of the Civil War, anti-Treaty forces were in full control of most of the west of Ireland. But when the National Army began to take over, the republicans increasingly turned to guerrilla tactics and a new phase of the war began, as Joost Augusteijn explains
The outbreak of the Civil War on 28 June initially only affected Dublin where the headquarters of the anti-Treaty IRA (ATIRA) was attacked by the new National Army. Although the Four Courts fell quickly, the republicans still controlled much of the countryside. The ATIRA was effectively in full control of most of the West, having set up bases in fortifiable buildings, such as workhouses, old castles and police or military barracks in urban centres. Apart from some isolated posts, the National Army had only two strong garrisons in the West, in Roscommon and east Galway.

In the first week of the conflict, the western IRA did successfully attack some outlying army posts, like in Collooney on 1 July, and ambushed army reinforcements on two occasions. This yielded a large amount of weapons, including a prized armoured car, called the Ballinalee. But despite these small victories the anti-Treaty IRA did not push their numerical advantage in these early weeks and effectively left the army its strongholds.
National Army Advance
Although the Free State initially concentrated on the South, where the IRA had been strongest during the War of Independence and most resistance was expected, some army units were moved into the West from the large army bases in Athlone and Limerick. They slowly asserted themselves, taking control of some of the major towns like Sligo and areas closer to Dublin in Roscommon, Leitrim, east Galway and Clare, which was part of the IRA's 1st Western Division.

Initially, progress was slow, but after relatively heavy armoury, such as artillery and armoured cars were brought in by General Séan Mac Eoin, the anti-Treaty IRA was dislodged from a number of its most important bases, particularly in Boyle and Castlerea.
After this, the Free State forces had more or less total control over Clare and the eastern part of the West, while Mayo, west Galway and rural parts of Sligo remained in the hands of republicans until the end of July.
A further push into the West by the National Army was initiated by a seaborne assault in Westport on 24 July and a land attack from Boyle to Claremorris. Resistance was limited, as the anti-Treaty IRA had learned from experiences in Boyle and elsewhere that trying to control buildings was impossible against the army’s heavy firepower. They abandoned their bases as soon as the army approached, setting fire to the evacuated fortified buildings.
After the landing in Clifden on 14-15 August, the army controlled all of the towns in the West but this did not mean they had defeated the ATIRA, as many contemporary commentators suggested. There were, after all, still thousands of relatively well-armed republicans who were not defeated and controlled much of the countryside.
The IRA rebounds
After leaving the towns, the ATIRA divided their forces into flying columns of various sizes concentrated in the more remote mountainous regions. There were particularly strong columns in west and north Mayo, south Sligo, north Leitrim, Connemara and the area around Tuam. The units in Mayo and Sligo under Michael Kilroy and Frank Carty were, by then, among the most active in the country.
There was, however, relatively little actual conflict between the two sides. While the bulk of the National Army was engaged in the South, the units in the West focused on training their inexperienced recruits. To facilitate this they concentrated their forces, which numbered slightly over 2,000, in a limited number of towns, sometimes more than forty miles apart.
Standoff!
As a result, a kind of standoff developed. The anti-Treaty IRA columns were not strong enough to take control of fixed posts, so they focused on breaking up communications lines and staging diversion attacks on the remaining army posts, trying to draw out troops in order to ambush them in open terrain.

Their knowledge of local conditions and the relatively good support in the countryside gave them a certain advantage over their better-armed opponents. Consequently, the Free State troops did not venture out very much or only in large numbers, and open fights were very few.
The passivity of the Free State troops quickly emboldened the anti-Treaty IRA, who regained control over some ungarrisoned towns and managed to successfully overcome the National Army units in a number of other towns from early August onwards. Their major successes included the taking of Ballina on 12 September followed by Sligo and Clifden in October. They never actually garrisoned these places, but simply left after disarming the local army unit.
Overall, casualty figures remained very low. Neither side suffered injury in the taking of Ballina, for example, but two civilians were killed in the crossfire.
Free State Sweeps
In an attempt to gain control, the Free State instituted a new policy of large scale drives. In September, large-scale sweeps by the ever-increasing National Army troops broke up the local republican strength in most of rural Sligo, Roscommon, Leitrim and east Galway, and resulted in the loss of some of their principal leaders, including the commanders of the 2nd and 4th Western Divisions.
![Copy report from an intelligence officer [of the National Army] in Swinford detailing the activities of Irregulars in areas of Co. Mayo and Co. Sligo, National Library of Ireland](https://img.rasset.ie/001c8273-614.jpg?ratio=0.64)
Commandant Tom Maguire was surprised and taken prisoner with 100 men at Shrule by a former comrade who had once carried him to safety after he was injured in the ambush at Tourmakeady during the War of Independence. Michael Kilroy was caught in November after being wounded in one of the bloodiest fights of the Civil War in Mayo, in which five National Army soldiers died.
Arrogant "outsiders"?
In the autumn of 1922, the army still had difficulties with the strong units in Mayo and in the bordering parts of Galway and Sligo, where the first big sweep came as late as November. These difficulties were partly the result of the poor discipline among the soldiers, evidenced by the use of unwarranted force against civilians.
Although the National Army had been widely welcomed in late July 1922, the soldiers quickly lost the trust of many local people who considered them arrogant and 'outsiders’. Consequently, the army did not receive civilian intelligence about the whereabouts of the local IRA which made locating them very difficult.
Despite not having a very coherent strategy, the republicans were mobile, had local roots, and could easily hide on the many islands and remote places of the west of Ireland. On occasion, when Free State soldiers were forced to surrender to the republicans, they were always released after surrendering their weapons. While this enhanced republican firepower, it did not undermine the strength of their opponents. Nevertheless, by the end of 1922 Mayo was, together with Kerry, still the republican hotspot in the country.
A Free State internal report from the beginning of 1923 stated that Mayo was the only county in the West where republicans were still able to carry out operations on an extensive scale, and the only county where ‘the Irregular regime’ still held.
These maps show National Army operation reports for three command areas: Donegal, Athlone, and Claremorris. They are compiled for the three months of January, February, and March 1923, a key period in the nine-month guerrilla conflict.
Each map provides different pictures of the Free State counter-insurgency campaign. In late August 1922, the IRA abandoned conventional tactics and reverted to guerrilla warfare to defeat the Irish Free State. However, by early 1923, republican resistance was beginning to collapse. Demoralization, lack of popular support, and a persistent National Army foe unravelled the IRA organization and set the stage for a comprehensive military defeat.
In Donegal, most republican resistance had ended by January, and the National Army focused on mopping up IRA fugitives. Here we see some major arrests and Free State raids across Donegal and the northern tips of Sligo and Leitrim.
The second map comes from the Athlone command area, and shows much more IRA activity in counties Leitrim, Roscommon, Westmeath, Offaly, and Laois. Most of this republican resistance was infrastructure sabotage, such as the blocking of roads, attacks on railways, and destruction of bridges, to hinder National Army movement and disrupt the economy.
The third map shows National Army operations in the Claremorris (Co. Mayo) command area, encompassing Mayo and parts of counties Sligo, Roscommon and Galway. Here the Free State forces were less successful in their raids for IRA fighters. However, while the republicans remained at large, their campaign was now primarily defensive, with only limited property attacks undertaken. By the end of March 1923, IRA leaders in all parts of Ireland had begun to debate whether or not to continue the war. Within weeks, this would lead to a ceasefire ordered by the harried IRA Executive.
Each map provides different pictures of the Free State counter-insurgency campaign. In late August 1922, the IRA abandoned conventional tactics and reverted to guerrilla warfare to defeat the Irish Free State. However, by early 1923, republican resistance was beginning to collapse. Demoralization, lack of popular support, and a persistent National Army foe unravelled the IRA organization and set the stage for a comprehensive military defeat.
In Donegal, most republican resistance had ended by January, and the National Army focused on mopping up IRA fugitives. Here we see some major arrests and Free State raids across Donegal and the northern tips of Sligo and Leitrim.
The second map comes from the Athlone command area, and shows much more IRA activity in counties Leitrim, Roscommon, Westmeath, Offaly, and Laois. Most of this republican resistance was infrastructure sabotage, such as the blocking of roads, attacks on railways, and destruction of bridges, to hinder National Army movement and disrupt the economy.
The third map shows National Army operations in the Claremorris (Co. Mayo) command area, encompassing Mayo and parts of counties Sligo, Roscommon and Galway. Here the Free State forces were less successful in their raids for IRA fighters. However, while the republicans remained at large, their campaign was now primarily defensive, with only limited property attacks undertaken. By the end of March 1923, IRA leaders in all parts of Ireland had begun to debate whether or not to continue the war. Within weeks, this would lead to a ceasefire ordered by the harried IRA Executive.
The last phase
And so, in the last phase of the Civil War, the struggle in the West was concentrated there. Minor guerrilla style attacks still took place in other counties, notably in the Ox Mountains in Sligo and in the Arigna Mountains on the border of Sligo and Leitrim, where Ned Bofin, the ‘Republican DeWet’, led a strong column.

Elsewhere local units became occasionally active. On 11 January 1923 Sligo railway station was burned down by forty IRA men, damaging seven engines and forty carriages, while on 12 February Ballyconnell was raided.
In the last months of the Civil War, the National Army continued its sweeps to round up IRA men and capture their arms, while the IRA concentrated on mostly small-time operations, with some larger units occasionally staging larger ambushes and attacks. After the ceasefire and dump arms orders of April and May 1923, most anti-Treaty IRA refused to surrender to the new authorities. Some even continued to engage in the fighting. This was stimulated by the fact the Free State did not accept the ceasefire and continued to order its troops to engage the IRA. Effectively, it was well into 1924 before the war was really over in the West.
This article is part of the Civil War project coordinated by UCC and based on The Atlas of the Irish Revolution edited by John Crowley, Donal Ó Drisceoil, Mike Murphy and John Borgonovo. Its contents do not represent or reflect the views of RTÉ.