Change may not come soon for Syria

Ray Colgan looks at the ongoing crisis in Syria, amid fears that the conflict is heading for a stalemate

It's been another day of bloodshed in Syria with government forces continuing to pound the rebel stronghold of Homs.

Human Rights groups now believe the deathtoll since the uprising began last month is around 7,000. Amnesty International believes that 200 died in Homs in the past week alone. There is widespread agreement that that President Assad's days are numbered.

But that is not to say that the regime's demise is imminent. In fact, many experts are now predicting a bloody stalemate that could last for months, with both sides struggling to make a decisive move.

This is a battle the Assad regime cannot win. Even in Damascus people have been able to take to the streets in relatively isolated incidents to oppose the President.

There is growing diplomatic pressure too, with Gulf states now withdrawing their ambassadors. But few expect change to be imminent. Unlike Libya, there's little prospect of military intervention by outside forces.

The Assad family and the Baath party's reach is extensive. Local party branches and elements of the state security apparatus extend around the country.

Even under pressure, the regime is a far more cohesive force than the rebels seeking to oppose it. But the government is vulnerable to collective disobedience on a wide scale; unlike Libya, there is little oil money to spend to keep people onside.

While there have been defections from the military, they have not been on a large scale. It's worth noting too that they tended to come from the lower ranks. Some in the higher ranks are antipathetic to the regime, but clearly they believe the regime is not yet at tipping point.

The protesters are not yet a mass movement. It is for the most part confined to the provinces. Syria's middle classes, though in many cases hostile to the regime, have not taken to the streets in support of change.

In part, that's due to the regime contention that those involved in the uprising are thugs or terrorists. There are also fears of sectarianism in a post-Assad Syria. Limited diplomatic options remain.

The Carnegie Centre for the Middle East predicts continuing pledges of reform; enough to calm allies Russia and China, enough to maintain the diplomatic log-jam at the UN Security Council.

The Arab League has put in place a proposal for President Assad to transfer power and to hold speedy elections. But there is no consensus among members on what the next diplomatic move should be. Not only is there little realistic prospect of military intervention, neighbouring Turkey, despite its enthusiasm to play the role of dominant regional power, has downplayed suggestions it might enforce a humanitarian corridor.

The likelihood is a stalemate lasting months rather than years.

Opponents of the regime outside and inside Syria have now probably done as much as they can. Assad will not be able to quell the revolt, but they're finding it difficult to broaden their appeal, or to hold on to territory they've won.

So, where will change come from? In Egypt, it seems tipping point was reached when the army realised that President Mubarak remaining in power actually threatened their own position, and risked much greater change.

Could the same forces be at work in Damascus? The Carnegie Centre for the Middle East suggests a scenario where Alawi religious leaders exert pressure on Assad to negotiate from a position of power, while he still can. The alternative is a slower erosion of the regime.

Either way, it seems likely the bloodshed will continue for some time to come.

Ray Colgan